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Diese Analyse der Faktoren, die große Firmen groß machen, wurde überall sofort als ein Klassiker und eines der besten Business-Bücher seit In Search of Excellence bejubelt. Die Autoren, James C. Collins und Jerry I. Porras, recherchierten sechs Jahre lang und geben offen zu, daß ihre eigene vorgefaßte Meinung über geschäftlichen Erfolg durch ihre tatsächlichen Ergebnisse zerschmettert wurde - und so ging es allen anderen mehr oder weniger auch. Built to Last greift 18 visionäre Firmen heraus und stellt fest, was an ihnen besonders ist. Um auf die Liste zu kommen, mußte eine Firma weltweit bekannt sein, ein herausragendes Markenimage besitzen und mindestens 50 Jahre alt sein. Hier geht es um Firmen, von denen sogar der Laie weiß, daß sie, sagen wir mal, anders sind: Firmen vom Kaliber Disney, Wal-Mart oder Merck. Was auch immer bei diesen Firmen der Schlüssel zum Erfolg sein mag, der Schlüssel zum Erfolg dieses Buches ist die Tatsache, daß die Autoren keine Zeit damit verschwenden, diese Firmen mit geschäftlichen Mißerfolgen zu vergleichen. Statt dessen benutzen sie eine Kontrollgruppe aus "erfolgreichen, aber zweitrangigen" Firmen, um hervorzuheben, was an ihren 18 visionären Firmen so besonders ist. Auf diese Weise wird Disney mit Columbia Pictures verglichen, Ford mit General Motors, Hewlett Packard mit Texas Instruments und so weiter. Am wenigsten trifft das Gerücht zu, so die Autoren, daß visionäre Firmen mit einem erfolgreichen Produkt anfangen und von charismatischen Managern in die Zukunft geführt werden müssen. Sie geben zu, daß es Beispiele dieses Musters gibt: Johnson & Johnson, beispielsweise. Aber es gibt einfach zu viele Gegenbeispiele - von den visionären Firmen passen sogar die meisten nicht in dieses Schema, darunter Riesen wie 3M, Sony und TI. Sie hatten anfänglich weder irgendeinen Geschäftsplan noch eine Schlüsselidee vorzuweisen und zeichneten sich durch erstaunlich zurückhaltende Manager aus. Collins und Porras waren viel mehr von etwas anderem beeindruckt: Von der geradezu kultischen Hingabe zu einer Kernideologie oder Identität sowie einer aktiven Indoktrination der Angestellten mit dem Ziel, eine ideologische Ergebenheit gegenüber der Firma zu erreichen. Der Vergleich mit der "B-Mannschaft" wirft allerdings ein bedeutendes methodologisches Problem auf: Welche Firmen sollen überhaupt als visionär eingestuft werden? Es hat etwas von einem Zirkelschluß, wenn man visionären Status erreicht, indem man - visionären Status besitzt. Es führen so viele Wege nach Rom, daß das Buch weniger praktisch ist, als es erscheinen mag. Aber genau darum geht es in einem eloquenten Kapitel über 3M. Diese überaus erfolgreiche Firma hatte keinen Gesamtplan, eine schwache Struktur und keine Primadonnen. Dafür besaß sie eine Atmosphäre, in der intelligente Leute daran interessiert waren, daß die Firma Erfolg hatte, und keine Angst davor hatten, "einen Haufen Dinge auszuprobieren und das, was funktionierte, zu behalten". -Richard Farr This analysis of what makes great companies great has been hailed everywhere as an instant classic and one of the best business titles since In Search of Excellence. The authors, James C Collins and Jerry I Porras, spent six years in research, and they freely admit that their own preconceptions about business success were devastated by their actual findings-along with the preconceptions of virtually everyone else. Built to Last identifies 18 "visionary" companies and sets out to determine what's special about them. To get on the list, a company had to be world famous, have a stellar brand image, and be at least 50 years old. We're talking about companies that even a layperson knows to be, well, different: the Disneys, the Wal-Marts, the Mercks. Whatever the key to the success of these companies, the key to the success of this book is that the authors don't waste time comparing them to business failures. Instead, they use a control group of "successful-but-second-rank" companies to highlight what's special about their 18 "visionary" picks. Thus Disney is compared to Columbia Pictures, Ford to GM, Hewlett Packard to Texas Instruments, and so on. The core myth, according to the authors, is that visionary companies must start with a great product and be pushed into the future by charismatic leaders. There are examples of that pattern, they admit: Johnson & Johnson, for one. But there are also just too many counter-examples-in fact, the majority of the "visionary" companies, including giants such as 3M, Sony, and TI, don't fit the model. They were characterised by total lack of an initial business plan or key idea and by remarkably self-effacing leaders. Collins and Porras are much more impressed with something else they shared: an almost cult-like devotion to a "core ideology" or identity, and active indoctrination of employees into "ideologically commitment" to the company. The comparison with the business "B" team does tend to raise a significant methodological problem: which companies are to be counted as "visionary" in the first place? There's an air of circularity here, as if you achieve "visionary" status by ... achieving visionary status. So many roads lead to Rome that the book is less practical than it might appear. But that's exactly the point of an eloquent chapter on 3M. This wildly successful company had no master plan, little structure, and no prima donnas. Instead it had an atmosphere in which bright people were both keen to see the company succeed and unafraid to "try a lot of stuff and keep what works." -Richard Farr This analysis of what makes great companies great has been hailed everywhere as an instant classic and one of the best business titles since In Search of Excellence. The authors, James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, spent six years in research and they freely admit that their own preconceptions about business success were devastated by their actual findings-along with the preconceptions of virtually everyone else. Built to Last identifies 18 "visionary" companies and sets out to determine what's special about them. To get on the list, a company had to be world famous, have a stellar brand image and be at least 50 years old. We're talking about companies that even a layperson knows to be, well, different: the Disneys, the Wal-Marts, the Mercks. Whatever the key to the success of these companies, the key to the success of this book is that the authors don't waste time comparing them to business failures. Instead, they use a control group of "successful-but-second-rank" companies to highlight what's special about their 18 "visionary" picks. Thus Disney is compared to Columbia Pictures, Ford to GM, Hewlett Packard to Texas Instruments, and so on. The core myth, according to the authors, is that visionary companies must start with a great product and be pushed into the future by charismatic leaders. There are examples of that pattern, they admit: Johnson & Johnson, for one. But there are also just too many counterexamples-in fact, the majority of the "visionary" companies, including giants like 3M, Sony and TI, don't fit the model. They were characterised by total lack of an initial business plan or key idea and by remarkably self-effacing leaders. Collins and Porras are much more impressed with something else they shared: an almost cult-like devotion to a "core ideology" or identity and active indoctrination of employees into "ideological commitment" to the company. The comparison with the business "B"-team does tend to raise a significant methodological problem: which companies are to be counted as "visionary" in the first place? There's an air of circularity here, as if you achieve "visionary" status by ... achieving visionary status. So many roads lead to Rome that the book is less practical than it might appear. But that's exactly the point of an eloquent chapter on 3M. This wildly successful company had no master plan, little structure and no prima donnas. Instead it had an atmosphere in which bright people were both keen to see the company succeed and unafraid to "try a lot of stuff and keep what works." -Richard Farr, Amazon.com Built to Last became an instant business classic. This audio abridgement is read by the authors, who alternate chapters. Collins is a bit breathlessly enthusiastic, but clear and interesting; Porras, unfortunately, is poorly inflected and wooden. They set out to determine what's special about "visionary" companies-the Disneys, Wal-Marts, and Mercks, companies at the very top of their game that have demonstrated longevity and great brand image. The authors compare 18 "visionary" picks to a control group of "successful-but-second-rank" companies. Thus Disney is compared to Columbia Pictures, Ford to GM, and so on. A central myth, according to the authors, is that visionary companies start with a great product and are pushed into the future by charismatic leaders. Usually false, Collins and Porras find. Much more important, and a much more telling line of demarcation between a wild success like 3M and an also-ran like Norton, is flexibility. 3M had no master plan, little structure, and no prima donnas. Instead it had an atmosphere in which bright people were not afraid to "try a lot of stuff and keep what works." If you listen to this audiocassette on your daily commute, you may discover whether you are headed to a "visionary" place of work-and, if so, whether you are the kind of employee who fits your employer's vision. (Running time: two hours, two cassettes) -Richard Farr |
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